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Nam, Yoonsoo, M.A., Spring 2015                       Economics 
 
Do democratic governments improve environmental quality? 
 
Chairperson:  Katrina L. Mullan 
 
My research question is whether democratic countries improve the environment. This 
research question is important because many nowadays people are more than ever 
concerned about environmental quality, and researchers have produced mixed results of 
democratic governments’ effects on the environment. As an attempt to contribute to this 
area of research, I implement three different types of heterogeneity in the relationships 
between democratic countries and environmental quality. These three different types of 
heterogeneity include different environmental outcomes, separate components of 
democracy, and countries with different income levels. By using these three different types 
of heterogeneity, I may better understand the mechanisms through which democratic 
countries affect the environment.  
Although previous studies using countries around the world report that democratic 
governments usually improve environmental quality, I find that democratic countries have 
an insignificant effect on the environment when I include 145 countries at the same time. 
However, I find that democratic governments sometimes have effects (usually positive) on 
environmental quality when I implement the three different types of heterogeneity into my 
analyses.  
When different environmental outcomes are considered, democratic countries reduce or 
have an insignificant effect on carbon reductions, increase or have an insignificant effect 
on protected areas. When individual components of democracy are considered, executive 
constraints are found to be the most informative component of democracy. Finally, when 
the countries with different income groups are considered, democracy in low-income 
countries reduces carbon emissions, and in high-income countries reduces carbon 
emissions and increases the size of protected areas.  
  
 
 1 
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 2 
2. Literature review and research hypotheses .................................................................... 6 
3. Data descriptions ............................................................................................................. 14 
4. Methodologies .................................................................................................................. 28 
5. Empirical results ............................................................................................................. 32 
6. Discussion ......................................................................................................................... 36 
7. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 42 
Figure 1 .................................................................................................................................... 47 
Figure 2 .................................................................................................................................... 47 
Table 1 ..................................................................................................................................... 48 
Table 2 ..................................................................................................................................... 49 
Table 3 ..................................................................................................................................... 50 
Table 4 ..................................................................................................................................... 51 
Table 5 ..................................................................................................................................... 52 
Table 6 ..................................................................................................................................... 53 
Table 7 ..................................................................................................................................... 54 
Table 8 ..................................................................................................................................... 55 
Table 9 ..................................................................................................................................... 56 
Table 10 ................................................................................................................................... 57 
References ............................................................................................................................... 58 
 
 
 2 
1. Introduction 
Do democratic governments improve environmental quality? Al Gore, the 2007 
Nobel Peace Prize winner, said that “an essential prerequisite for saving the environment is 
the spread of democratic government to more nations of the world.”1 The spread of 
democracy may be important because democratic governments may affect good environment.  
Although democratic countries may affect environmental quality, research addressing 
this topic has produced mixed results: some researchers find that political institutions 
improve2, worsen3, or have no effect on the environment.4 These mixed results exhibited in 
the literature could be attributable to a number of factors: different estimation methods or 
control variables; different environmental outcomes; or alternatively, it may be that different 
components of democracy have different impacts or that the relationship differs in countries 
with different characteristics (e.g., income levels). I contribute to this existing body of 
literature by using different types of environmental quality, different component variables 
constituting democracy, and countries with different income groups to understand the 
potential heterogeneity in the relationship between institutions and the environment. 
What are political institutions? The Nobel prize-winning institutional economist 
Douglass North (1990, 3) states that “institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, 
more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” Although 
institutions are usually categorized into two types, formal and informal, I consider political 
institutions as belonging to formal institutions. 
                                                 
1 (Gore 1992, 179). 
2 (Barrett and Graddy 2000; Congleton 1992; Fredriksson and Neumayer 2013; Gallagher and Thacker 2008; 
Hosseini and Kaneko 2013; Li and Reuveny 2006; Mak and Lew 2011; Midlarsky 1998; Neumayer 2002; 
Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2006; Yoon 2014). 
3 (Barrett and Graddy 2000; Congleton 1992; Hosseini and Kaneko 2013; Mak and Lew 2011; Midlarsky 1998). 
4 Most of the papers supporting that democratic countries improve or worsen environmental quality report at 
least one or more insignificant results associated with democratic governments, but emphasize the directions if 
they seem to be relatively consistent. 
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While various factors introduced in the previous paragraph might account for the 
mixed results, institutions, the key explanatory variable of this paper, have been mostly 
represented by variables from the Polity IV Project dataset by the Center for Systematic 
Peace. The Polity IV Project scores the authority characteristics of states in the world. The 
Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual states that the Polity IV dataset is “the most widely 
used resource for monitoring regime change and studying the effects of regime authority.” 
Using measures from this widely-used dataset, I hope to understand the relationships between 
political institutions and environmental quality. 
To understand the relationships between institutions and the environment, I treat 
democracy and autocracy as separate political institutions. Treating democracy and autocracy 
separately rather than as opposite ends of the same spectrum will give me new information. 
The structure of democracy can be represented by a separation of power among a large 
number of people whereas that of autocracy can be represented by a separation of power 
among a small number of people.  
Although some researchers have already incorporated autocracy in their analyses (Li 
and Reuveny 2006; Neumayer 2002), most studies have excluded explicit effects of 
autocracy on environmental quality. Therefore, I examine two very different political 
structures to understand the relationships between political institutions and the environment. 
As part of separating political institutions into democracy and autocracy, I offer a 
fresh perspective by incorporating three different types of composite indicators: revised 
combined Polity score, institutionalized democracy, and institutionalized autocracy. The first 
two represent democracy and the last one represents autocracy. Using these three composite 
indicators helps discover the mechanisms through which institutions affect environmental 
quality by identifying which aspects of political institutions are important. These composite 
indicators are named and managed through the Polity IV Project (Polity IV 2012). 
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I differentiate this paper from the earlier studies by incorporating separate 
components of democracy in assessing the relationships between institutions and 
environmental quality. I implement four different component variables: competitiveness of 
executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, executive constraints, and 
competitiveness of political participation.  
A country receives the highest score for competitiveness of executive recruitment if 
the country’s chief executive such as a council, a cabinet, a king, a premier and a president is 
selected by a competitive election involving two or more parties. A country receives the 
highest score for openness of executive recruitment if the country’s chief executive is selected 
by (1) a competitive election involving two or more parties, (2) an elite designation, or (3) a 
pre-arrangement between a competitive election and an elite designation. A country receives 
the highest score for executive constraints if the country’s accountability group such as 
legislatures, a ruling party, or a council of nobles has more or equal power than a country’s 
chief executive. A country receives the highest score for competitiveness of political 
participation if the country’s ruling party competitively or voluntarily shifts the central power 
to a competing party. These variables form institutionalized democracy which is one of the 
aforementioned three composite indicators. Using these four component variables in addition 
to institutionalized democracy helps understand the sources of potential heterogeneity 
between political institutions and environmental quality by identifying which aspects of 
democracy are important.  
I also use three different measures of environmental outcomes. The environment is 
very important because it can be directly related to people’s health, and the good environment 
may reflect how educated or wealth a country is. The more numbers of media attention to 
environmental quality issues have made people more concerned than ever. Furthermore, more 
people are conscious about environmental issues through easier access to knowledge 
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accumulated by researchers. Although environmental quality can be measured in many ways, 
I incorporate environmental outcomes corresponding to global air pollutants, land quality and 
natural resources, and sustainable development policies. These environmental quality features 
are driven by different processes, so institutions may affect them differently. Using these 
comprehensive environmental outcomes, I hope to understand the relationships between 
political institutions and the environment.  
Finally, I extend previous work in this field by analyzing the relationships between 
institutions and environmental quality for countries with different income levels. Assessing 
the effects of political institutions on the environment for countries with different income 
groups is important because even countries with better institutions may engage in activities 
degrading environmental quality if doing so is likely to make them richer. A New York Times 
columnist, Gardiner Harris (2014), writes about the Indian government’s unwillingness to 
improve the environment, even when its citizens’ health suffers: 
‘Suffering widespread respiratory and skin disorders, residents accuse the 
government of allowing fires to burn and allowing pollution to poison 
them as a way of pushing people off land needed for India’s coal rush. 
“The government wants more coal, but they are throwing their own 
people away to get it,” said Ashok Agarwal of the Save Jharia Coal Field 
Committee, a citizens’ group.’ 
 
What is so ironic about this current event is that democratic countries may not lead to 
improved environmental quality for a poor country where economic growth is a higher 
priority. The Indian government rates as highly democratic, with an average institutionalized 
democracy score of ≈+8.79 from 1992 to 2010 on a scale of 0 (just democratic) to +10 
(strongly democratic). This example suggests that the impacts of political institutions on the 
environment may differ for countries with different levels of income. Therefore, using 
countries with different income groups helps discover the mechanisms through which 
institutions affect environmental quality. 
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I contribute to the existing body of literature by using various measures of 
environmental quality, component variables constituting democracy, and countries with 
different income groups in understanding the relationships between political institutions and 
the environment. Few studies researched the relationships between institutions and 
environmental quality in this detail. These detailed analyses will help understand the 
relationships between political institutions and the environment. This paper is organized as 
follows: Section 2 reviews previous studies and provides several research hypotheses, Section 
3 describes the data, Section 4 addresses estimation methodologies, Section 5 describes the 
results, Section 6 discusses the results, and finally Section 7 concludes. 
2. Literature review and research hypotheses 
Recent studies in environmental economics often focus on factors that may have 
determinant effects on environmental quality. One of these factors is considered to be a 
country’s level of democracy and this factor is investigated in this paper.  
Early studies used cross-sectional data and found that democratic governments often 
improve the environment. More recent papers use panel data due to the advancement of 
technology, the increase in collection of data for economic and political analyses, and the 
increase in awareness of environmental quality.  
Panel data have advantages over cross-sectional data in having the option to control 
for time-invariant country characteristics that may be correlated with both political 
institutions and the environment. Furthermore, panel data also have an advantage in 
providing a greater number of observations. Studies using panel data find that democratic 
countries usually improve environmental quality, even though the results of these papers are 
not fully consistent with one another.5  
                                                 
5 (Barrett and Graddy 2000; Congleton 1992; Fredriksson and Neumayer 2013; Gallagher and Thacker 2008; 
Hosseini and Kaneko 2013; Li and Reuveny 2006; Midlarsky 1998; Neumayer 2002; Yoon 2014). 
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Existing literature suggests four key mechanisms through which democratic 
governments may produce better or worse environment than autocratic governments: (1) 
democratic governments aim to satisfy the majority while autocratic governments aim to 
satisfy the elites, and these populations may have different preferences6; (2) democratic 
governments are less likely to effectively enact policies than autocratic governments7; and (3) 
democratic governments are more likely to participate in global environmental treaties than 
autocratic governments.8 I will introduce these mechanisms in the order as they appear above. 
Furthermore, I will provide some possible hypotheses at the end of each mechanism. The 
discussion section of this paper will assess whether these hypotheses hold. Table 1 shows the 
three mechanisms and the four corresponding hypotheses. 
The first mechanism proposed in the existing literature is that democratic 
governments aim to satisfy the majority while autocratic governments aim to satisfy the 
elites, and these populations may have different preferences. In other words, democratic 
governments act in the interests of the majority and autocratic governments in the interests of 
the elites. In democracy, a government must act in the interests of majority because there is a 
large winning coalition (De Mesquita et al. 1999). Although democratic countries act in the 
interests of the majority, autocratic countries, an institution that is opposite to democracy for 
this paper, act in the interests of the elites. The elites in autocracy may not like environmental 
regulation if it lowers production and consumption because this reduces the elite’s benefits 
(Congleton 1992). In contrast, under democracy, a greater number of people in both the 
                                                 
6 (Barrett and Graddy 2000; Congleton 1992; De Mesquita et al. 1999; Grossman and Krueger 1995; Hosseini 
and Kaneko 2013; Kotov and Nikitina 1995; Li and Reuveny 2006; Mak and Lew 2011; Midlarsky 1998; 
Neumayer 2002; Payne 1995; Schultz and Crockett 1990).  
7 (Gallagher and Thacker 2008; Hardin 1968; Li and Reuveny 2006; Mak and Lew 2011; Pellegrini and Gerlagh 
2006; Yoon 2014). 
8 (Barrett and Graddy 2000; Congleton 1992; Hosseini and Kaneko 2013; Li and Reuveny 2006; Mak and Lew 
2011; Payne 1995). 
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winning coalition and the electorate may be concerned if only a few people receive benefits 
from looser environmental regulations (Congleton 1992).  
Since the preferences of the majority are prioritized in a democracy to a greater 
degree than in an autocracy, an environmental regulation benefitting many people while 
hurting only a few is more likely to be enacted. For example, Li and Reuveny (2006), and 
Midlarsky (1998) find that democratic countries improve land quality and natural resources. 
Since democratic governments value the preferences of majority over minority, democratic 
countries have the potential to improve land quality and natural resources benefitting the 
majority. For the same reasons, Barrett and Graddy (2000), Li and Reuveny (2006), and Mak 
and Lew (2011) find that democratic governments improve water quality.  
Conversely, autocratic countries may worsen environmental quality if its leaders 
receive fewer benefits from having environmental regulations. Li and Reuveny (2006) find 
that autocratic countries worsen water quality by increasing the ratio of organic pollution 
levels in water to the amount of internal renewable water resources. These researchers also 
find that autocratic governments worsen land quality and natural resources by decreasing the 
percentage share of the forested area within the total land area; increasing average annual 
deforestation rates per decade; and increasing the share of severely and very severely 
degraded land out of the total land area. Furthermore, Neumayer (2002) finds that less 
democratic countries worsen land quality and natural resources by decreasing the percentage 
of land area under protection. Autocratic governments may worsen environmental quality 
since the chance of enacting an environmental regulation, if it reduces benefits received by 
autocratic leaders, is very low. 
A caveat to this argument is that since democratic countries act in the interests of the 
majority, democratic governments may refrain from improving the environment if the 
majority of voters lose economically from certain environmental policies (Hosseini and 
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Kaneko 2013). Midlarsky (1998) finds that democratic countries worsen land quality and 
natural resources by increasing the annual deforestation percentage and average soil 
degradation by water. He argues that for countries where logging or other related activities 
are the main sources of income, environmental regulations protecting forests are likely to be 
rejected by the countries’ citizens. These countries are usually poor. This means the 
relationships between political institutions and environmental quality may differ among high- 
and low-income countries. Furthermore, demand for better environment is higher in rich 
countries (Grossman and Krueger 1995). Consequently, in low-income countries, democratic 
governments may worsen land quality and natural resources. 
Democratic countries may not be able to improve global environmental quality in a 
timely manner because democracy is national or local in character, whereas the environment 
is global in character, as stated by Hosseini and Kaneko (2013) in their literature review. 
Since democratic governments work in the interest of its own country, they want to improve 
environmental outcomes that are externalities from a national point of view and only consider 
national costs to benefits. Congleton (1992) finds that democratic countries worsen global air 
quality by increasing net methane and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). Finally, Midlarsky (1998) 
finds that democratic governments worsen global air quality by increasing CO2 emissions per 
capita. Since democratic countries have local characteristics and usually focus on 
environmental quality within the borders of their countries, democratic governments may 
worsen global air quality between countries. 
Similarly, although autocratic countries may worsen environmental quality, research 
specifically addressing autocracy suggests that autocratic governments may improve the 
environment in some cases. Although Mak and Lew (2011) do not specifically measure the 
impacts of autocracy in their analyses, they find that democratic countries worsen land 
quality and natural resources by increasing deforestation damage. The researchers explain 
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their findings by acknowledging that autocratic governments may manage land quality and 
natural resources better than democratic countries if protecting forests provides benefits to the 
autocratic governments. Barrett and Graddy (2000) find that using certain measures of 
democracy and certain environmental outcomes, low civil freedom dummy, one of their 
variables representing low level of democracy, improves water quality. Since autocratic 
countries may improve the environment if doing so gives the country’s elites benefits, 
autocratic governments may improve environmental quality. 
The first mechanism is that democratic governments aim to satisfy the majority while 
autocratic governments aim to satisfy the elites, and these populations may have different 
preferences. The existing studies addressing this first mechanism suggest that democratic and 
autocratic governments may improve or worsen the environment depending on the specific 
preferences of the majority and the elites in a given country. The majority of citizens in a 
democracy are likely to care about environmental quality directly related to people’s health. 
However, the majority may vote against regulations because of the trade-off with economic 
activity if environmental issues do not directly affect the majority’s health and well-being. 
Using the same argument, the majority is expected to be more supportive of regulations that 
have local benefits rather than global benefits. Therefore, a possible hypothesis associated with 
this first mechanism that democratic governments aim to satisfy the majority while autocratic 
governments aim to satisfy the elites, and these populations may have different preferences is 
as follows.  
H1a: More democratic governments improve environmental outcomes directly 
affecting local health, while have no effect on or worsen environmental quality 
indirectly affecting local health. 
There is one more reason why I hypothesize that democratic governments lead to 
better environment directly related to people’s health. More access to information and rights 
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related to environmental quality helps the majority in democracy be more aware of 
environmental issues. Democratic citizens have more access to the free press and other forms 
of information regarding the environment (Payne 1995; Schultz and Crockett 1990). 
Democratic countries allow freedom of speech and organization among its citizens who then 
assemble and appeal to their governments about environmental issues (Kotov and Nikitina 
1995; Payne 1995). In addition, democratic governments may be held accountable or their 
ignorance of environmental quality if a noticeable environmental degradation takes place 
(Payne 1995). Since exchange of ideas regularly takes place in democratic countries, good 
ideas are shared. However, this mechanism will only apply if the majority are in favor of 
environmental regulations. 
Citizens of low- (high-) income countries care about both development and the 
environment, but trading economic development for environmental improvement is relatively 
more (less) costly. Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) literature (e.g., Grossman and 
Krueger 1995) finds that high-income countries have more demand for environmental 
regulations because high-income countries have achieved some level of economic 
development and want to reduce environmental degradation. Therefore, another hypothesis 
reflecting these differences in the costs of setting up environmental regulations and demands 
for better environment is as follows. 
H1b: Democratic governments lead to better environmental quality in high-
income countries, while lead to lower environmental quality in low-income countries. 
The second mechanism suggested in the existing studies is that democratic 
governments are less likely to effectively enact policies than autocratic governments. Before 
sharing papers claiming that democratic countries are less effective in enacting policies, I will 
first share studies suggesting that democratic governments may be more effective in enacting 
policies. Since democracy is a strong formal institution that establishes a consistent 
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foundation for enacting policies improving the environment (Gallagher and Thacker 2008), 
democratic governments may improve sustainable development policies. Li and Reuveny 
(2006) find that democratic countries improve sustainable development policies by 
decreasing a composite index measuring environmental pollution stress. Pellegrini and 
Gerlagh (2006) find that democratic governments improve sustainable development policies 
by increasing an environmental protection stringency index and decreasing an environmental 
regulatory regime index. Finally, Yoon (2014) finds that democratic countries improve 
sustainable development policies by increasing an environmental performance index score 
and an ecosystem vitality category score.  
Although democratic governments may improve environmental quality, some studies 
suggest that democratic countries may worsen environmental outcomes in both short run and 
long run. If the environment is considered a common good, unconstrained individuals or 
interest groups are more likely to overuse natural resources and ignore the damage of their 
actions on environmental quality (Hardin 1968). While this study seems to be a little bit older 
than other papers cited in this paper, it is so seminal that many scholars still incorporate it: 
irresponsible over-usage of natural resources by people who do not care about others is more 
likely to worsen the environment. Mak and Lew (2011) find that democratic governments 
worsen land quality and natural resources by increasing deforestation damage.  
In order to examine the ability of a government to enact policy, I focus on the extent 
to which a government is constrained from taking actions. Measures of democracy consist of 
separate components, not all of which affect policy implementation. Therefore, I consider 
executive constraints, which is one of the four component variables constituting 
institutionalized democracy. The other three component variables are competitiveness of 
executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, and competitiveness of political 
participation. Detailed descriptions about the variables are provided in the data descriptions 
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section of this paper. A government with strong executive constraints may have less freedom 
to implement environmental regulations relative to a government with weak executive 
constraints, or implementation may occur more slowly. However, other component variables 
are not likely to have the same types of effects. Therefore, a possible hypothesis associated 
with this second mechanism that democratic governments are less likely to effectively enact 
policies than autocratic governments is as follows. 
H2: Greater executive constraints lead to worse environmental quality. More 
democratic countries, measured as other component variables (e.g., competitiveness of 
political recruitment), have no effect on environmental quality. 
Finally, the third mechanism suggested in the existing literature is that democratic 
governments are more likely to participate in global environmental treaties than autocratic 
governments. Democratic countries may improve environmental quality because democratic 
governments are more likely to participate in international treaties improving the 
environment (Payne 1995). Since democratic countries are more likely to participate in global 
environmental treaties, they are more likely to model other successful countries also 
participating in the treaties. Therefore, democratic countries may improve global air quality. 
Barrett and Graddy (2000), Hosseini and Kaneko (2013), Li and Reuveny (2006), and Mak 
and Lew (2011) find that democratic governments improve global air quality. Finally, 
Congleton (1992) finds that democratic countries improve global air quality by decreasing net 
methane per GNP.  
Under this mechanism, the degree of democracy does not affect local environmental 
quality. However, more democratic governments improve global environmental outcomes. A 
possible hypothesis associated with this third mechanism that democratic governments are 
more likely to participate in global environmental treaties than autocratic governments is as 
follows. 
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H3: Democratic governments lead to better global environmental quality, while 
have no effect on local environmental quality. 
Research reveals mixed impacts of democratic and autocratic governments on 
environmental quality. The past studies focused on relationships between income and the 
environment. After learning that democratic countries may have determinant impacts on 
environmental quality, researchers have carefully designed models that may explain the 
relationships between democratic governments and the environment. More recent papers use 
more and better data, and more sophisticated estimation methods than earlier studies due to 
the advancement in a field of economics and technology. More recent papers9 seem to 
produce results suggesting that democratic countries usually improve environmental quality. 
However, this is not true in all cases. In addition, theoretical mechanisms suggested in 
literature do not give a single clear prediction about directions of relationships.  
Since the results have been mixed, this suggests that the relationships are more 
complex than so far assumed. I will examine some potential sources of heterogeneity in the 
relationship in order to better understand the underlying mechanisms. Therefore, my 
contribution is that since the hypotheses suggest different relationships in different context, I 
will investigate how the relationships between democratic countries and the environment 
varies by different types of environmental outcomes, types of components constituting 
democracy, and types of countries with different income levels. 
3. Data descriptions 
The entire dataset for this paper consists of an unbalanced panel of 145 countries 
between 1992 and 2010. The dataset is unbalanced because there are different numbers of 
                                                 
9 (Barrett and Graddy 2000; Fredriksson and Neumayer 2013; Gallagher and Thacker 2008; Hosseini and 
Kaneko 2013; Li and Reuveny 2006; Mak and Lew 2011; Neumayer 2002; Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2006; Yoon 
2014). 
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observations for different countries in different time periods. For example, Solomon Islands 
has a number of observation of 1, which is the minimum number of observation for the entire 
time span for a country. Conversely, some countries10 have a number of observations of 19, 
which is the maximum number of observations for the entire time periods for a country. 
Therefore, the range of number of observations is the difference between the maximum and 
the minimum, and is 18 for the entire time span. The total number of observations is 1,899.  
The way I calculated my sample size is different from that of Li and Reuveny (2006), 
who did not make the number of observations the same for different estimations. In other 
words, their reported results for CO2 per capita and organic water pollutants per km
3 are from 
different countries. The sample size for CO2 per capita is 3,833 and that for organic water 
pollutants per km3 is 1,344. Since the samples were not from the same countries, their 
estimation results would have been influenced by countries that belonged or did not belong to 
the estimations. In order to isolate differences due to types of environmental outcomes from 
differences due to sample composition, my sample is restricted to 1,899 observations by 
excluding all the explanatory and response variables that do not have observations. The same 
set of countries is also incorporated. 
Since different categories of outcomes might be affected differently by political 
institutions, I use three different environmental outcomes representing environmental 
pollution and environmental quality as response variables. These three environmental 
outcomes reflect global air pollution (CO2 emissions); measures of land and natural resources 
quality (terrestrial protected areas); and sustainable development policies quality (improved 
water sources).  
                                                 
10 Australia, Austria, Bulgaria, Finland Guinea, Japan, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, 
Namibia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Senegal, Spain, and Tunisia. 
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Table 2 shows the bottom twelve countries and Table 3 shows the top twelve 
countries for each variable to give an indication of where the variation is occurring. The value 
for each variable used to rank the countries is an average value of the variable between 1992 
and 2010. For example, column 1 of Table 2 represents CO2 emissions (kt)i. The variable, 
CO2 emissions (kt)i,t, represents global air pollution. CO2 emissions result from the burning of 
fossil fuels and the manufacturing of cement, among other things. The subscript i represents a 
country. Since countries are sorted in an ascending order, countries appearing on top in Table 
2 are the ones with the lowest CO2 emissions.  
The subscript t attached to the variable represents a time period t. The data also 
include carbon dioxide produced during consumption of solid, liquid, and gas fuels and gas 
flaring. Table 4 contains descriptive statistics of all the variables. The mean and standard 
deviation for CO2 emissions are 167,662 kilotons and 612,992 kilotons, respectively. CO2 
emissions’ standard deviation to mean ratio exceeds a constant one which suggests that their 
standard deviation is larger than their mean. This shows that CO2 emissions have a high 
variability. Countries having large land area in general have high CO2 emissions, while those 
having small land area have low CO2 emissions. The values for CO2 emissions are not size 
adjusted. The data for CO2 emissions and all other environmental outcomes are from World 
Bank Group (2012).  
The variable, terrestrial protected areas (% of total land area)i,t, represents land 
quality and natural resources quality. Terrestrial protected areas are totally or partially 
protected areas of at least 1,000 hectares that are designated by national authorities as 
scientific reserves with limited public access and other uses. The mean and standard deviation 
for terrestrial protected areas are 11.93% and 9.322%. Countries having large land area in 
general have high terrestrial protected areas, while those having small land area have low 
terrestrial protected areas.   
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Finally, the variable, improved water sources (% of population with access)i,t, 
represents sustainable development policies. It reflects the percentage of the population using 
an improved drinking water sources including piped water on premises (piped household 
water connections located inside the users’ dwelling, plot or yard) and other sources. The 
mean and standard deviation for improved water sources are 83.81% and 18.10%. Countries 
having high population density, which is calculated by total population divided by land area, 
in general have high improved water sources, while those having small population density 
have low improved water sources.  
The aforementioned relationships among land area, population density, CO2 
emissions, terrestrial protected areas, and improved water sources do not necessarily imply 
causality, but attempt to give some indications of other characteristics beside income that 
may be correlated with environmental quality. 
 The key explanatory variables for this paper are institutions. I am interested in 
institutions of democracy and autocracy which are two opposite political institutions. By 
separating democracy and autocracy, I may discover the mechanisms through which 
institutions affect the environment by identifying which aspects of political institutions are 
important. The variable, revised combined Polity scorei,t-1, represents the two different 
institutions. The variable ranges from -10 to +10, a country with a closer score to -10 means 
it is more autocratic and a country with a closer score to +10 means it is more democratic. 
This variable is a modified version of the Polity variable for time-series analyses. It applies a 
treatment filling in scaled Polity scores for observations that occur during political 
interregnums and transitions, which would otherwise be treated as missing values. These data 
and the other political institutional measures are from Polity IV (2012). The countries with 
the lowest average value of revised combined Polity score are Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Swaziland, Uzbekistan and Oman. The countries with the highest average value of revised 
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combined Polity score are Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Finland and 
Hungary. 
The variable, institutionalized autocracyi,t-1, reflects autocracy which is an institution 
favoring a fewer number of people in a ruling party and is contrasted with democracy for this 
paper. It is an eleven-point scale (0 to +10) measure constructed by adding the scores 
received for competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, 
executive constraints, competitiveness of political participation, and regulation of 
participation using pre-determined weights.  
The variable, institutionalized democracyi,t-1, represents democracy. It is an eleven-
point scale (0 to +10) measure constructed by adding the scores received for competitiveness 
of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, executive constraints, and 
competitiveness of political participation using pre-determined weights. The Polity IV 
Project calls these three measures of political institutions “three composite indicators.” 
Although institutionalized autocracy and institutionalized democracy look like they 
share the same component variables, institutionalized autocracy is composed of one extra 
component variable, regulation of participation, which does not belong to the four 
component variables constituting institutionalized democracy. More importantly, although 
the names of the component variables are the same, the way they are calculated is totally 
different. For example, executive constraints of institutionalized autocracy have the 
following criteria: (1) unlimited authority, (2) intermediate category, and (3) slight to 
moderate limitations. The criteria are numbered by the Polity IV Project. A country’s 
executive constraints receive a point of +3, +2, and +1 respectively if the country meets (1), 
(2), and (3), respectively. Conversely, the criteria for executive constraints of institutionalized 
democracy are: (7) executive parity or subordination, (6) intermediate category, (5) 
substantial limitations, and (4) intermediate category. If a country meets these criteria, the 
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country’s executive constraints receive a point of +4, +3, +2, and +1, respectively. Therefore, 
since the way that the component variables constituting institutionalized autocracy and 
institutionalized democracy is different, these two composite indicators individually measure 
autocracy and democracy. 
The variable, competitiveness of executive recruitment, refers to a selection of chief 
executives through popular elections matching two or more viable parties or candidates. The 
variable, openness of executive recruitment, refers to the extent to which all the politically 
active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized 
process. The variable, executive constraints, refers to the extent of institutionalized 
constraints imposed by accountability groups on the decision-making powers of chief 
executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Finally, the variable, competitiveness of 
political participation, refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and 
leadership can be pursued in the political arena. These four component variables form 
institutionalized democracy which is one of the aforementioned three composite indicators. 
These four component variables are also obtained from Polity IV (2012). 
In summary, the Polity IV Project data consist of the five component variables 
(competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, executive 
constraints, competitiveness of political participation, and regulation of participation). These 
component variables are coded along an ordinal scale reflecting assumptions about their 
relative weight. The weighted scores are summed to produce institutionalized autocracy and 
institutionalized democracy (regulation of participation, the fifth component variable, is 
excluded in this specific calculation). Finally, by subtracting institutionalized autocracy from 
institutionalized democracy, the variable revised combined Polity score is obtained. 
Although most studies include a variable for democracy and only a few studies 
include a variable for autocracy, in addition to “three composite indicators,” I offer a fresh 
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perspective by incorporating “four component variables”: competitiveness of executive 
recruitmenti,t-1, openness of executive recruitmenti,t-1, executive constraintsi,t-1, and 
competitiveness of political participationi,t-1. Using these four component variables in 
addition to institutionalized democracy helps find sources of heterogeneity in explaining the 
relationship between institutions and environmental quality by identifying which aspects of 
democracy are important.  
Institutionalized democracy and the four component variables forming 
institutionalized democracy have low standard deviation to mean ratio. The mean and 
standard deviation for institutionalized democracy are 5.687 and 3.968. The mean and 
standard deviation for competitiveness of executive recruitment are 2.096 and 1.071. The 
mean and standard deviation for openness of executive recruitment are 3.428 and 1.309. The 
mean and standard deviation for executive constraints are 5.003 and 2.038. The mean and 
standard deviation for competitiveness of political participation are 3.49 and 1.321. 
Since institutionalized democracy and the four component variables forming 
institutionalized democracy do not vary as much, institutionalized autocracy appears to drive 
much of the variation in revised combined Polity score. The mean and standard deviation for 
institutionalized autocracy are 1.854 and 2.79. The mean and standard deviation for revised 
combined Polity score are 3.82 and 6.522.  
Before I introduce my set of control variables besides the key explanatory variables, 
some arguments related to the validity of the Polity IV Project measures are provided as 
follows. Although many researchers attempt to develop measures representing political 
institutions, a set of the most widely used measures is by the Polity IV Project (Polity IV 
2012). Some alternative measures of political institutions include those of Alvarez et al. 
(1996); Arat (1991); Bollen (1980, 1991, 1993); Coppedge and Reinicke (1991); Freedom 
House (2000); Gasiorowski (1996); Hadenius (1992); and Vanhanen (2000). These measures 
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represent political institutions, particularly democracy. They tend to be based on 
effectiveness, fairness, freedom, and openness of elections; executive selections; legislative 
selections; party competitiveness; and freedom of organization. In their article, Munck and 
Verkuilen (2002) list the strengths and weaknesses of all of these aforementioned political 
institution measures.  
Although it is conceded that these political institution measures provide many useful 
insights, some scholars are concerned with these measures. Bowman, Lehoucq, and Mahoney 
(2005) analyze the Central American countries to find that the principal, long-term cross-
national scales of democracy including Gasiorowski (1996), Polity IV (2012), and Vanhanen 
(2000) are often inaccurate. Although these three measures are considered most popular and 
share high correlations based on their raw values, the researchers find that these measures are 
obtained by referring to less reliable secondary sources. 
The researchers examine a few countries whose democracy measures may be 
contestable. One of the countries is Costa Rica. The Polity IV Project scores Costa Rica as 
strongly democratic for every year between 1900 and 1999. These researchers believe that 
these scores are incorrect because they are based on less reliable secondary sources (e.g., 
President Oscar Arias’ speech during an event in 1989 celebrating the centennial of Costa 
Rican democracy). To mitigate issues with less reliable sources, these researchers suggest 
reading Spanish-language secondary sources, the US diplomatic correspondence, government 
documents, local newspaper, and interviewing local experts and eyewitnesses (Bowman 
2002, Lehoucq 1992, Lehoucq and Molina 2002). By engaging in these types of activities 
themselves, the researchers find that 16 coups against the central government occurred in 
Costa Rica by the opposition as a response to incumbents trying to impose their successors 
five times on the presidency between 1900 and 1955 (Lehoucq 1996). These researchers also 
find that the minister of defense, Federico Tinoco, overthrew his predecessor, Alfredo 
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González, who became the president in 1914 as a result of an extraconstitutional 
compromise. González did not even participate in an election campaign during the hotly 
debated 1913 general elections (Murillo Jiménez 1981).  
Using more examples including the cases with El Salvador and Nicaragua, the 
researchers acknowledge that the Vanhanen (2000) democracy index best measures the 
effects of the US occupation and the quality of elections out of all three democracy measures. 
However, the researchers also state that more reliable sources than the ones used by 
Vanhanen (2000) should be considered, and list many historically important events that may 
influence democracy measures of these countries. 
Although Bowman, Lehoucq, and Mahoney (2005) recommend political institution 
measures from Vanhanen (2000), one of the most widely used measures for political 
institutions are from the Polity IV Project and many scholars implement them in their 
analyses (e.g., Fredriksson and Neumayer 2013; Gallagher and Thacker 2008; Li and 
Reuveny 2003; 2006). However, many studies use these measures without explicitly 
justifying their reasons. This may potentially be attributable to a well-established tradition of 
using these measures in academic research, and lack of information provided by the Polity IV 
Project regarding their theoretical arguments and weighting schemes when calculating the 
variables (Munck and Verkuilen 2002).  
The Polity IV Project analysts are the ones assigning a score for each country on 
each scale. According to the Polity IV Project website, these analysts monitor “real-time 
events to make tentative assessments of the trajectories of unfolding political dynamics and 
their effect on the essential qualities of governing institutions, or patterns of authority.” 
Therefore, these analysts score the countries by monitoring real-time events from numerous 
sources, while these sources usually are not provided. One of a very few relevant statements 
found in the Polity IV Project: Dataset Users’ Manual states that “multiple historical sources 
 
 23 
were used for each country, along with reference to a variety of standard sources. The first 
step was to identify historical and social science works for each country, then to compile 
from them a basic political chronology. Periods of substantial change were identified in this 
process and then examined in detail to determine whether events met the specified criteria for 
changes in and of polities. The same sources provided information for the coding of authority 
characteristics.” Therefore, the Polity IV Project analysts indeed refer to relevant sources, but 
these sources are not necessarily reported in the Manual probably due to too many volumes 
and limited writing spaces. Finally, the Polity IV Project website states that these analysts 
regularly re-examine recent annual Polity records during each annual update, re-examine 
historical cases because users and country experts raise questions about the data, and may 
refine the data based on new information or the correction of errors in the records. Therefore, 
the Polity IV Project analysts are aware of the fact that their data are not always correct, and 
attempt to make many corrections to improve their data. 
Some scholars report problems associated with the Polity IV Project data. Munck and 
Verkuilen (2002) state that the Polity IV Project’s five component variables are weighted 
differently by using different scales and assigning a different number of points for each 
component variable. The researchers claim that although weighted scores provide a legitimate 
way of acknowledging the greater or lesser theoretical importance of different component 
variables, the Polity IV Project has no justification for the weighting scheme. Therefore, these 
researchers claim that the Polity IV Project analysts use subjective pre-determined scores 
without providing specific information on how the weighting scheme works for each 
component for each country. The researchers also claim that this operation is not based on 
theoretical justification and the Polity IV Project has conceptual logic problems. These 
researchers argue that the Polity IV Project data include pairs of redundant component 
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variables, which lead to a fair amount of double counting that is never acknowledged or 
explained.  
Although Munck and Verkuilen (2002) share concerns with the Polity IV Project 
data, these researchers describe some objective strengths of the Polity IV Project data. As 
opposed to other political institution measures, the Polity IV data clearly identify the 
component variables; provide specific coding rules in a fair amount of detail; use multiple 
codes; do good jobs in the recording and publicizing of the coding rules, the coding process, 
and the disaggregated data. Furthermore, the researchers acknowledge that since the Polity IV 
Project data are publicly available, independent scholars may tailor the data for their own use.  
Although the Polity IV Project data do not necessarily share information on what 
kind of theoretical arguments are incorporated and use subjective judgments on their 
weighting schemes, some other scholars praise the measures’ advantages. Gerring et al. 
(2005) acknowledge that the measures usually offer extensive country coverage (all 
sovereign polities except microstates) and good historical coverage. Furthermore, the 
measures help consider both the degree and the duration of democracy in any given country-
year. These researchers argue that, compared to other measures of democracy, the Polity IV 
Project measures are on average better. Confirming that the measures correlate highly with 
other democracy measures, the researchers state that there is no reason to suspect systematic 
errors in the Polity IV Project measures. However, the researchers acknowledge that 
democracy measures from the Polity IV Project may be prone to errors, and the construction 
of the measures is very complex.  
Many papers tried to establish measures capturing democracy11, but Bowman, 
Lehoucq, and Mahoney (2005) claim that many of these attempt to generate measures based 
                                                 
11 (Alvarez et al. 1996; Arat 1991; Bollen 1980, 1991, 1993; Coppedge and Reinicke 1991; Freedom House 
2000; Gasiorowski 1996; Hadenius 1992; Vanhanen 2000). 
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on less reliable sources. However, due to the aforementioned strengths, data availability, and 
a wide-implementation, I use political institution measures from the Polity IV Project in my 
paper. Although the measures are appreciated by academic communities and sometimes do a 
good job capturing the characteristics of democracy, users of the Polity IV Project should not 
believe that the measures are perfect and use them with caution. 
 In addition to the key explanatory variables, I use a number of control variables. The 
control variables included are the ones that may vary with both political institutions and the 
environment. If they are not included, the estimations would produce biased impacts of 
institutions on environmental quality.  
Some of the control variables that are widely used by other studies include types of 
economic development measures of countries.12 The variable, GDP per capita (constant 2005 
US $)i,t-1, represents economic development of countries. Since past studies find that 
environmental degradation against income is represented as an inverted U shape (Grossman 
and Krueger 1995), GDP per capita and its squared term are used to reflect economic 
development of the countries. This inverted U relationship is called an Environmental 
Kuznets Curve (EKC). As an economy produces more output, its income or GDP per capita 
increases. However, as income increases, environmental degradation increases due to more 
waste coming from more intensive production processes. However, this degradation stops at a 
location called the turning point because more people recognize the importance of 
environmental quality (Grossman and Krueger 1995). Therefore, degradation decreases as 
income passes the turning point, and cleaner production technology and fewer resources are 
used. Data are in constant 2005 US dollars. The mean and standard deviation for GDP per 
                                                 
12 (Barrett and Graddy 2000; Congleton 1992; Fredriksson and Neumayer 2013; Gallagher and Thacker 2008; 
Hosseini and Kaneko 2013; Li and Reuveny 2006; Mak and Lew 2011; Midlarsky 1998; Neumayer 2002; 
Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2006; Yoon 2014). 
 
 26 
capita are $9,847 and $14,636. The ratio of GDP per capita exceeds a constant one. The data 
for GDP per capita and all other control variables are from World Bank Group (2012).  
Another important set of control variables that are widely used by other studies 
include the size of nations.13 Two measures represent the size of nations. They are the 
variables total populationi,t-1, and land area (km
2)i,t-1. Total population is a mid-year estimate 
and this figure counts all residents regardless of legal status or citizenship except for refugees 
not permanently settled in the country of asylum. Land area is a country's total area, 
excluding area under inland water bodies and other zones. I hypothesize that as total 
population increases, CO2 emissions increase due to more people consuming and producing 
goods. Furthermore, I hypothesize that as total population increases, terrestrial protected 
areas decrease due to more people using agricultural land for food and industry. The mean 
and standard deviation for total population are approximately 40 million and 133 million. 
Total population has the highest standard deviation to mean ratio out of all control variables. 
The mean and standard deviation for land area are approximately 808,583 km2 and 2 million 
km2.  
Another variable, urban population (% of total)i,t-1, is a measure of the structure of 
the economy. Urban population refers to people living in urban areas as defined by national 
statistical offices. The mean and standard deviation for urban population are 55.08% and 
22.51%. 
I use two other control variables. The first variable reflects economic activities, and 
the second variable represents social activities. The variable, trade (% of GDP)i,t-1, reflects 
economic activities. Trade is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured 
as a share of gross domestic product. Brunnermeier and Levinson (2004) give an example of 
                                                 
13 (Barrett and Graddy 2000; Congleton 1992; Hosseini and Kaneko 2013; Li and Reuveny 2006; Mak and Lew 
2011; Midlarsky 1998; Neumayer 2002). 
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trade that may affect the environment. The researchers state that environmental quality of a 
country increases as a country trades environmentally clean goods such as compostable 
products. The researchers also state that these countries are obligated to have more stringent 
environmental regulations imposed by some international treaties that the countries have 
signed. Furthermore, the researchers argue that trade may improve economic development of 
countries, which then may improve the environment by decreasing environmental pollution. 
This is a similar justification used to explain the EKC. The mean and standard deviation for 
trade are 79.61% and 41.17%.  
The second control variable reflecting social activities is the variable primary 
education enrollment ratei,t-1. This is obtained by dividing the total number of students 
enrolled in public and private primary education institutions by population of age between 0 
and 14. Li and Reuveny (2006) claim that national structural variables (e.g., education) may 
affect environmental degradation. The mean and standard deviation for primary education 
enrollment rate are approximately 36.2% and 8.92%. The descriptive statistics in Table 5 
suggest that environmental outcomes, and economic activities vary more than political 
institutions do.  
Figures 1 and 2 display environmental outcomes across countries and over time, 
respectively. The data for Figure 1 are the average values for each country, while those for 
Figure 2 are the average values for each time period. Since both terrestrial protected areas 
and improved water sources are in percentage, proportion of CO2 emissions instead of actual 
CO2 emissions is used for easier comparisons. Proportion of CO2 emissions is calculated by 
dividing the actual CO2 emissions by the maximum CO2 emissions value.  
Figure 1 plots environmental quality against institutionalized democracy. Although 
the countries’ names are not labeled for visual convenience, improved water sources show 
the steepest slope, which suggests that more democratic countries are associated with high 
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improved water sources. The slopes of other two environmental outcomes are not as steep. 
Therefore, improved water sources vary the most across countries. 
Figure 2 plots environmental quality against time represented by year. Unlike Figure 
1, where improved water sources have the steepest slope, proportion of CO2 emissions has 
the steepest slope. This seems to suggest that more recent time periods are associated with 
high CO2 emissions. The slopes of other two environmental outcomes are not as steep. 
Therefore, CO2 emissions vary the most across the time span. Tables 5 and 6 show the 
correlations of the response variables and explanatory variables, respectively. 
4. Methodologies 
The majority of recent studies on this topic use panel data. Consequently, the 
estimation methods switched from a simple estimation method of ordinary least squares 
(OLS)14 to more advanced estimation methods, including two-way fixed effects estimation15, 
a random effects estimation16, and generalized least squares.17 
I, similarly, conduct panel data analyses. I use a two-way fixed effects model to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity in country characteristics as well as general trends over 
time. Equation (1.1) below helps describe a two-way fixed effects estimation. 
(1.1) 𝐸𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑞𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖,𝑡−1 +
𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝑹𝑶𝑳 𝑽𝑨𝑹𝑰𝑨𝑩𝑳𝑬𝑺𝛀 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,  
where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡. 
In a two-way fixed effects model in Equation (1.1), 𝛼𝑖 is an unobserved 
heterogeneity capturing all unobserved characteristics staying constant over time and 
                                                 
14(Congleton 1992; Midlarsky 1998; Neumayer 2002; Pellegrini and Gerlagh 2006). 
15(Barrett and Graddy 2000; Gallagher and Thacker 2008; Hosseini and Kaneko 2013; Li and Reuveny 2006; 
Yoon 2014). 
16(Barrett and Graddy 2000; Hosseini and Kaneko 2013). 
17(Mak and Lew 2011; Yoon 2014). 
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affecting Environmental qualityi,t, which consists of CO2 emissionsi,t, terrestrial protected 
areasi,t, and improved water sourcesi,t.  
Political institutionsi,t-1 consists of revised combined Polity scorei,t-1, institutionalized 
autocracyi,t-1, institutionalized democracyi,t-1, competitiveness of executive recruitmenti,t-1, 
openness of executive recruitmenti,t-1, executive constraintsi,t-1, and competitiveness of 
political participationi,t-1.  
𝑪𝑶𝑵𝑻𝑹𝑶𝑳 𝑽𝑨𝑹𝑰𝑨𝑩𝑳𝑬𝑺 is a vector of control variables and is multiplied by a 
coefficient vector 𝛀. CONTROL VARIABLES consists of GDP per capitai,t-1, its squared 
term, total populationi,t-1, urban populationi,t-1, land areai,t-1, tradei,t-1, primary education 
enrollment ratei,t-1, and YEAR DUMMIES, which is a vector of year dummies.  
Some unobserved characteristics that vary across countries (𝛼𝑖) include global/local 
biophysical attributes (e.g., atmospheric integrity, existing damage, and climate). These 
unobserved characteristics may affect environmental quality (Li and Reuveny 2006). Cultural 
factors may affect care for the environment. Historical focus on certain types of policies may 
also affect environmental quality. Furthermore, other measures such as geographical features, 
demographic features of the population (age, race, and etc.), and historical differences (e.g., 
attitudes) toward the environment are also included in 𝛼𝑖.
18 Although these characteristics 
may not always be constant, they are considered approximately constant because they change 
very slowly over time.  
The fixed effect, 𝛼𝑖, may be correlated with political institutions because it may help 
shape certain institutions. Therefore, my estimated results may be biased if I fail to control 
for the unobserved heterogeneity, 𝛼𝑖. 
                                                 
18 (Wooldridge 2008, 460). 
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Consequently, I implement a two-way fixed effects estimation using time-demeaned 
variables to remove the unobserved heterogeneity from Equation (1.1). A pooled OLS 
estimator that is based on the time-demeaned variables is called the fixed effects estimator.19 
A pooled OLS is different from a regular OLS by having year dummies. The fixed effects 
transformation successfully removes any explanatory variable that is constant over time for 
all countries.20 Therefore, my estimation would eliminate bias due to correlations of the fixed 
effect, 𝛼𝑖, with variables measuring institutions.  
Although a two-way fixed effects estimation helps produce more reliable results, 
there is a cost. Since a two-way fixed effects model only captures variation within countries 
over time instead of variation between countries, a two-way fixed effects model uses less 
variation. Therefore, since much variation in the response variables is not explained by other 
right-hand-side (RHS) variables, especially by the political institutions, I may not be able to 
find many statistically significant results.  
The error, 𝑢𝑖𝑡, in Equation (1.1) is an idiosyncratic error. It represents unobserved 
characteristics changing over time, affecting Environmental qualityi,t  and Political 
institutionsi,t-1. Although I may not be able to fully remove an idiosyncratic error, 𝑢𝑖𝑡, I 
include control variables to reduce the effects of an idiosyncratic error, 𝑢𝑖𝑡. The control 
variables include GDP per capita, its squared term, total population, urban population, land 
area, trade, primary education enrollment rate, and YEAR DUMMIES. However, this 
approach may not fully control some other remaining unobserved characteristics varying over 
time, which will bias the results. 
Even after controlling the effects of an idiosyncratic error, 𝑢𝑖𝑡, a simultaneity 
problem may be an issue. If I use explanatory variables in a given year with response 
                                                 
19 (Wooldridge 2008, 485). 
20 (Wooldridge 2008, 485). 
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variables in the same year, there may be a problem of simultaneity: I may not be able to tell 
whether it is institutions influencing environmental quality or it is the environment 
influencing political institutions. As Fredriksson and Neumayer (2013) provide as a 
justification for their use of instrumental variable (IV) estimation, countries with poor 
environmental quality may demand more democracy. Therefore, the environment may 
influence institutions. Furthermore, a simultaneity problem is not only relevant to the 
response variables and the key explanatory variables but also to the control variables: 
degradation in land quality may reduce agricultural economy’s exports, or an increase in 
exports resulting from high production may worsen environmental quality. To reduce this 
effect, I lag all the RHS variables by one year. Other studies (e.g., Oneal and Russett 1999; Li 
and Reuveny 2003; 2006) also follow this approach. 
Since there are issues of heteroskedasticity, I implement the Huber-White robust 
standard errors (White 1982) to control for possible heteroskedasticity issues, which represent 
a state where the variance of an idiosyncratic error, 𝑢𝑖𝑡, is not constant. Furthermore, there is 
another issue of serial correlations. However, the year dummies capturing the temporal 
dynamics in the panel data in my two-way fixed effects estimation already control for 
possible serial correlation issues (Li and Reuveny 2006), which represent a state where there 
are correlations between idiosyncratic errors, 𝑢𝑖𝑡, in different time periods. 
Instead of using a one-tailed test, I use a two-tailed test. A one-tailed test assesses 
whether a positive effect of democratic governments on environmental quality has the same 
magnitude as a negative effect of democratic countries on the environment. A two-tailed test 
assesses whether there is an effect of democratic governments on environmental quality 
against a null hypothesis that there is no effect of democratic countries on the environment. 
Many other studies follow this latter approach (e.g., Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 1998; 
Oneal and Russett 1999; Li and Reuveny 2003; 2006). 
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Finally, if I find different relationships between democratic governments and 
environmental quality by using all countries at the same time, I may not be able to get valid 
estimates for countries with different income levels. Therefore, I also interact institutions and 
countries with four different income groups (low-, lower middle-, upper middle-, and high-
income). 
5. Empirical results 
Table 7 displays the effects of the three composite indicators of political institutions 
on three different environmental outcomes. Columns 1 through 3 show the results on CO2 
emissions. Columns 4 through 6 show the results on terrestrial protected areas. Columns 7 
through 9 show the results on improved water sources. All the samples for Tables 7 through 
10 were taken from 1992 to 2010 in 145 countries. 
In columns 1 through 3, democratic governments have an insignificant effect on CO2 
emissions, and autocratic countries are not significantly associated with CO2 emissions. In 
columns 4 through 6, autocratic governments are positively associated with terrestrial 
protected areas. Democratic countries do not significantly affect terrestrial protected areas. 
In columns 7 through 9, there appears to be no impact of democratic governments on 
provision of improved water sources. Autocratic countries have an insignificant impact on 
improved water sources.  
Among the control variables, an increase in GDP per capita has a positive but 
diminishing effect on CO2 emissions, even though the squared term of GDP per capita is 
insignificant. CO2 emissions are also higher for countries with larger populations. The control 
variables are insignificantly associated with terrestrial protected areas. Finally, an increase 
in GDP per capita has a negative but increasing effect on improved water sources. Improved 
water sources are also higher for countries with larger populations, and higher levels of 
education. 
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Given the lack of an overall relationship between the composite indicators of 
institutions and environmental quality, I examine the impacts of four individual component 
variables of democracy. Table 8 displays the effects of the four component variables on three 
different environmental outcomes. Columns 1 through 4 show the results on CO2 emissions. 
Columns 5 through 8 show the results on terrestrial protected areas. Columns 9 through 12 
show the results on improved water sources. Since the signs and significance of coefficients 
for the control variables are very similar to those reported in Table 7, Tables 8 through 10 
include the control variables in regressions, but do not report their coefficients to help focus 
on the impacts of the political institutions. 
In columns 1 through 4, all components of democracy do not significantly affect CO2 
emissions. In columns 5 through 8, I observe no significant effect of all components of 
democracy besides a positive effect of competitiveness of political participation on terrestrial 
protected areas. In columns 9 through 12, all components of democracy do not significantly 
affect improved water sources.  
Not a single component of democracy has effects on environmental outcomes 
besides competitiveness of political participation. It is interesting to observe that both 
institutionalized autocracy and competitiveness of political participation have a positive 
effect on terrestrial protected areas given that the Polity IV Project states that countries 
scoring high on institutionalized autocracy oppress competitiveness of political participation. 
Although institutionalized autocracy and competitiveness of political participation 
have a significantly positive effect on terrestrial protected areas, political institutions in 
general do not seem to affect environmental quality. Little variation in institutions over time 
may be one of several reasons why there is a lack of significance.  
However, even if there is not one overall effect of political institutions on the 
environment, it is possible that there may be effects that vary by context: there are different 
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effects on different environmental quality, the distinct components of democracy affect the 
environment in different ways, and the relationship between democratic governments and 
environmental outcomes varies in countries with different income groups. The previous 
insignificant effects of institutions on environmental quality may be due to a failure to 
account for these differences. Therefore, I will use interaction terms to separately identify the 
impacts of political institutions for different income levels rather than estimating a single 
effect for all countries. This reasoning is also supported by Mak and Lew (2011) and is 
further discussed in the discussion section of this paper. Therefore, I include interaction terms 
between institutions and countries with different income groups (e.g., executive constraints × 
low-income country dummy). This approach is different from the one used by Mak and Lew 
(2011) who just use sub-samples of countries with different income levels. 
Table 9 displays the marginal effects of the three composite indicators at four 
different income groups on three different environmental outcomes. Columns 1 through 3 
show the results on CO2 emissions. Columns 4 through 6 show the results on terrestrial 
protected areas. Columns 7 through 9 show the results on improved water sources. When the 
effects of political institutions on environmental quality are estimated separately for countries 
with different income levels, the relationships between democratic countries and 
environmental outcomes differ in sign, statistical significance and magnitude. 
Since Tables 9 and 10 report marginal effects, interpretations on the coefficients are 
different from those for Tables 7 and 8. In columns 1 through 3 (see Table 9), revised 
combined Polity score and institutionalized democracy reduce CO2 emissions in low-, and 
high-income countries. There is no significant effect in lower middle- and upper middle-
income countries.  
In columns 4 through 6, institutionalized autocracy increases terrestrial protected 
areas in lower middle-income countries, while the results on revised combined Polity score 
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and institutionalized democracy suggest that democratic governments increase terrestrial 
protected areas in high-income countries. There is no significant effect in low- and upper 
middle-income countries. The results jointly show that democratic countries increase 
terrestrial protected areas in high-income countries. In columns 7 through 9, democratic 
governments do not significantly affect provision of improved water sources in any of the 
income groups. 
Table 10 displays the marginal effects of the four component variables at four 
different income groups on three different environmental outcomes. Columns 1 through 4 
show the results on CO2 emissions. Columns 5 through 8 show the results on terrestrial 
protected areas. Columns 9 through 12 show the results on improved water sources. 
Where there is a relationship observed between democratic countries and 
environmental quality, it appears to be mainly driven by executive constraints. Executive 
constraints reduce CO2 emissions in low- and high-income countries, while the results on 
executive constraints suggest that democratic countries increase terrestrial protected areas in 
high-income countries. Executive constraints reduce improved water sources in low-income 
countries. There is no significant effect in lower middle- and upper middle-income countries. 
The results jointly show that executive constraints reduce CO2 emissions in low- and high-
income countries, and increase terrestrial protected areas in high-income countries.  
The other three measures are largely not significant. Some exceptions are that 
openness of executive recruitment in low-income countries reduces CO2 emissions. 
Competitiveness of political participation in high-income countries increases terrestrial 
protected areas. Furthermore, openness of executive recruitment in upper middle-income 
countries increases improved water sources. 
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6. Discussion 
The key finding of this paper is that some aspects of democracy improve some aspects 
of environmental quality in some countries. For example, out of the four component 
variables, executive constraints have the greatest number of effects on the environment 
compared to other aspects of democracy followed by openness of executive recruitment, 
competitiveness of political participation, and competitiveness of executive recruitment. Out 
of the three environmental outcomes, democratic governments have the greatest number of 
effects on CO2 emissions followed by terrestrial protected areas and improved water sources. 
There appear to be generally positive effects on environmental quality in low- and high-
income countries, and positive or insignificant effects in middle-income countries. 
Although the existing literature seems to suggest that democratic governments 
usually improve environmental quality, my findings suggest that political institutions, 
whether they are measured as democracy, autocracy, or component variables of democracy, 
do not have significant overall effects on the environment if I use all 145 countries at the 
same time. These findings are displayed in Tables 7 and 8, and indicate that the relationships 
between democratic governments and environmental quality are more complex than the 
existing literature suggests. Studies that generally show an effect usually share similar 
methodologies as mine, but cover earlier time periods and do not necessarily include control 
variables capturing education. The relationships do vary by context however, there are 
different impacts on environmental outcomes, the separate components of democracy 
influence the environment in different ways, and the relationship between democratic 
countries and environmental quality varies in countries with different income levels.  
In Tables 7 and 8, democratic governments have no overall significant effect on the 
environment even though two of the three different types of heterogeneity in the relationships 
between democratic countries and environmental quality (different environmental quality and 
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different components of democracy) are implemented. I attribute this insignificance to a 
failure of incorporating another and probably more informative type of heterogeneity, 
countries with different income groups. Implementing this last type of heterogeneity with the 
former two produces much more informative results. These results are provided in Tables 9 
and 10.  
The discussion below refers to Table 9. Democracy in low-income countries reduces 
carbon emissions. My results suggest that as opposed to less democratic, low-income 
countries, it is more democratic, low-income countries that reduce carbon emissions even 
though the existing studies (e.g., Grossman and Krueger 1995) states that people in low-
income countries usually develop more interests in economic development. One other 
possible reasons is that more contemporary low-income countries do not necessarily follow 
the footsteps by the other traditional low-income countries. The more contemporary low-
income countries learn from the mistakes by the other traditional low-income countries and 
develop interests in saving the environment. Democratic countries having positive impacts on 
carbon reductions help support a view that democracy in low-income countries improves the 
environment even though low-income countries are usually thought to be primarily interested 
in economic development. 
I find that autocracy in lower middle-income countries improves the size of protected 
areas. This finding seems to be supportive of the idea by Mak and Lew (2011), who argue 
that autocratic countries will better manage land quality and natural resources if doing so 
provides the elites more benefits. This result seems to be deriving the positive association 
between autocratic governments and protected areas reported in Table 7. 
Democracy in high-income countries has the most significant impacts, and all of 
them are associated with improvement in carbon reductions and protected areas. Although the 
existing papers (e.g., Grossman and Krueger 1995) state that people in high-income countries 
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usually develop more interests in improving the environment, my results suggest that it is 
democratic, high-income countries that reduces carbon emissions and increases the size of 
protected areas. Since high-income countries are usually known to be more interested in 
improvements in environmental quality, democratic countries having positive impacts on 
carbon reductions and protected areas help support a view that democracy in high-income 
countries improves the environment. 
I find that democratic governments have an insignificant effect on access to clean 
drinking water. One possible reason for the absence of a relationship between democratic 
countries and access to improved water sources is that most countries have achieved high 
levels of access to clean drinking water regardless of how democratic they are. Descriptive 
statistics in Table 4 show that the mean of access to improved water sources between 1992 
and 2010 is 83.81%. This suggests that roughly 83.81% of the population around the world 
has access to clean drinking water. Since access to improved water sources are directly 
related to people’s health, countries might have prioritized development of access to clean 
drinking water more than other environmental quality, regardless of their institutions. 
Therefore, access to improved water sources may not be a good response variable to check 
whether democratic and autocratic governments may influence the environment. The three 
composite indicators still have an insignificant effect on clean drinking water sources even if 
I only compare the results among low-income countries. 
More meaningful results are also found when the analyses incorporate components of 
democracy. Executive constraints in low- and high-income countries improve carbon 
reductions (see Table 10), and executive constraints in high-income countries increase the 
size of protected areas. This seems to suggest that although accountability groups have more 
or equal power than a chief executive, agreements on policies related to environmental 
quality that are global in nature may be more easily achieved than expected in low- and high-
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income countries. Since the coefficients of executive constraints share the same signs and 
have a larger magnitude than those of democratic countries, this component of democracy 
seems to be deriving the previous results of revised combined Polity score and 
institutionalized democracy observed in Table 9.  
Except in a few cases (openness of executive recruitment in low- and upper middle-
income countries; and competitiveness of political participation in high-income countries), all 
other components of democracy beside executive constraints have an insignificant effect on 
the environment. In general, these other components of democracy do not necessarily 
represent time it takes to process decisions related to environmental quality. However, these 
components besides executive constraints are more about ways chief executives get selected 
and shifts of power between a ruling party and a competing power. Hence, competitiveness of 
executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, and competitiveness of political 
participation have less direct impacts on environmental quality as opposed to executive 
constraints. Therefore, these other components of democracy usually have an insignificant 
effect on the environment. 
 Since an overall discussion on the empirical findings has been provided, I now compare 
the results with my hypotheses developed in the literature review and research hypotheses 
section. As democratic governments are expected to act in the interest of the majority to a 
greater extent than autocratic governments, the impacts of democratic countries were predicted 
to be positive for environmental outcomes directly affecting local health and in high-income 
countries. The relationship was hypothesized to be insignificant or negative for environmental 
quality indirectly affecting local health and negative for democracy in low-income countries. 
Access to improved water sources are considered to have direct health impacts, while carbon 
reductions and protected areas are indirect.  
Democracy in high-income countries reduces carbon emissions, increases the size of 
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protected areas, but has an insignificant impact on access to clean drinking water. This partially 
agrees with the hypothesis that democracy in high-income countries has a positive impact on 
the environment. However, this disagrees with the hypothesis that democratic governments 
have an insignificant or a negative impact on environmental quality indirectly affecting local 
health. Democracy in low-income countries reduces carbon emissions. This disagrees with the 
hypothesis that democracy in low-income countries has a negative impact on environmental 
quality. Finally, the results show that democratic countries have an insignificant effect on 
access to improved water sources. This disagrees with the hypothesis that democratic 
governments have a positive impact on environmental quality directly affecting local health. 
Overall, democratic processes have no significance on environmental outcomes directly 
affecting local health, while democracy in high-income countries improves the environment.  
Since democratic governments are associated with high executive constraints and thus 
a chief executive’s decisions may be rejected by accountability groups, the impacts of executive 
constraints were predicted to be negative for environmental quality. The results show that 
executive constraints in low- and high-income countries reduce carbon emissions and increase 
the size of protected areas. These findings disagree with the hypothesis. Executive constraints 
in low-income countries are associated with less access to clean drinking water. This partially 
agrees with the hypothesis. Overall, executive constraints improve the environment.  
Since democratic governments are expected to participate more in global 
environmental treaties, the impacts of democratic governments were predicted to be positive 
for global environmental quality. The relationship was hypothesized to be insignificant for a 
local environmental outcome. Access to improved water sources is considered to be local 
environmental quality, while carbon reductions and protected areas are global.  
The results show that democratic countries have an insignificant effect on local 
environmental outcome agreeing with the hypothesis that democratic governments have an 
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insignificant effect on local environmental quality. Democracy in low-income countries 
reduces carbon emissions, and democracy in high-income countries reduces carbon emissions 
and increases protected areas. This partially agrees with the hypothesis that democratic 
governments have a positive effect on global environmental quality. Overall, democracy in 
low- and high-income countries improves the environment. 
The hypotheses and the results in general support a view that there is no 
single/straightforward impact of democratic countries on environmental quality. However, the 
relationships vary by context: there are different effects on different environmental outcomes, 
the individual components of democracy influence the environment in different paths, and the 
relationships between democratic governments and environmental quality vary in countries 
with different income groups. 
Once these three different types of heterogeneity in the relationships between 
democratic governments and environmental quality are considered, the idea of democratic 
countries improving the environment because it acts in the interests of majority partially 
seems to work. Democracy in high-income countries reduces carbon emissions and increases 
the size of protected areas. The idea of more executive constraints worsening environmental 
quality because agreements on policies between a chief executive and accountability groups 
having more or equal power than a chief executive is more difficult does not seem to hold. 
Executive constraints in low- and high-income countries reduce carbon emissions and 
increase protected areas. Finally, the idea that democratic countries improving global 
environmental quality because democratic countries have higher participation rates in global 
environmental treaties seems to hold. Democracy in low- and high-income countries reduces 
carbon emissions, and democracy in high-income countries increase the size of protected 
areas. 
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7. Conclusion 
Some aspects of democracy improve some aspects of environmental quality in some 
countries. The key findings of this paper are as follows: Out of four different components of 
democracy, executive constraints have the most number of effects on environmental quality. 
Democratic governments have the most number of effects on CO2 emissions. Finally, middle-
income countries have an insignificant or positive effect on the environment, while low- and 
high-income countries usually have a positive impact on environmental quality. 
I consider democratic governments and environmental quality in this paper. In general, 
democratic countries seem to have an insignificant effect on the environment when all 145 
countries are used at the same time. However, when I include different types of environmental 
outcomes, components of democracy, and countries with different income levels, democratic 
governments sometimes have effects (usually positive) on environmental quality. I implement 
these three different types of heterogeneity in the relationships between democratic countries 
and environmental quality to better understand the sources of potential heterogeneity.  
When considering different environmental outcomes, based on Table 9, I find that 
democratic governments either reduce or have no effect on carbon emissions, increase or have 
no effect on the size of protected areas, and have no effect on access to clean drinking water. 
When separate components of democracy are used, I find that executive constraints are the 
most important component variable. Finally, when countries with different income groups are 
considered, democracy in low-income countries reduces carbon emissions, and in high-income 
countries it reduces carbon emissions and increases protected areas. However, democracy in 
middle-income countries has an insignificant effect on the environment. 
Since the existing studies find that democratic countries usually improve 
environmental quality, its policy implications are that countries should become more 
democratic to improve the local and global environment. However, my findings suggest that 
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becoming democratic does not always lead to improved environmental quality, and there are 
many other factors to consider when improvement of the environment is a main concern.  
Democracy in low- and high-income countries reduce carbon emissions, democracy 
in high-income countries improve protected areas, while democracy in middle-income 
countries have an insignificant effect on environmental quality. Therefore, a policy 
implication is that democratic governments improve the environment if the majority prefers 
improvements in environmental quality. 
Executive constraints in low- and high-income countries improve carbon reductions 
and the size of protected areas, while executive constraints in middle-income countries have 
an insignificant effect on the environment. A policy implication is that an agreement on 
environmental quality is feasible even if there is a high level of executive constraints. 
Finally, democratic governments improve global environmental outcomes because 
democratic countries participate more in global environmental treaties. A policy implication 
is that other countries should support democracy because it helps improve the environment. 
My results seem to be quite different from the existing studies, which find that 
democratic governments usually improve environmental quality using all the countries at the 
same time. Although my research shares similarity with many existing papers in using panel 
data and a two-way fixed effects estimation, I differ from the existing studies by including 
more explanatory variables that may affect political institutions and the environment. 
Existing papers do not necessarily have as many important control variables as mine does. 
Although existing studies mostly have GDP per capita, its squared term and some variables 
related to populations, my set of controls differ from the existing papers by including total 
population, land areas, and urban population all at the same time. Furthermore, I include 
trade and primary education enrollment rate. By including another economic variable and an 
education variable that not many studies have included, my results reduce issues related to 
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omitted variables and provide more detailed insights on the relationships between democratic 
governments and environmental quality.  
The effects of democratic countries may operate through these additional control 
variables. In other words, if democratic governments increase trade or education, and these are 
the mechanisms through which democratic countries improve the environment, the effect will 
be removed by including them as controls. Therefore, an inclusion of these control variables 
may be one possible reason for less significance for democratic governments on environmental 
quality.  
In addition to including more relevant control variables, the results differ from prior 
papers by incorporating three different environmental outcomes capturing comprehensive 
environmental quality. Although some previous studies are interested in the relationship 
between political institutions and the environment, some papers only include one or two 
environmental outcomes. Therefore, by implementing a broader set of environmental 
outcomes, my results better explain the relationships between democratic countries and 
environmental quality. These relationships are complex and not easily explained by just one 
or two environmental outcomes. For example, assume there is another researcher studying 
sulphur dioxide (SO2), deforestation, and fecal coliforms. The first two environmental 
outcomes represent local environmental quality and the latter one represents environmental 
outcome affecting local health. By having these different types of environmental quality, the 
researcher may better understand the sources of potential heterogeneity in the relationships 
between democratic governments and the environment. 
As more control variables and environmental outcomes are implemented, I also 
differentiate my work from the existing studies by incorporating components of democracy. 
Since there are many factors constituting democracy, it is important to look for which factor 
plays an important role in explaining the relationships between democratic countries and 
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environmental quality. Assessing the component variables of democracy specifically is a very 
unique approach and doing so provides useful results. Let us again consider the case of the 
hypothetical researcher. Since SO2 and deforestation may be considered as local 
environmental quality and fecal coliform as environmental quality affecting local health, the 
researcher would be less likely to find some significant results without considering separate 
components of democracy as my results do with access to improved water sources. 
Therefore, this researcher should consider using individual components of democracy to 
better understand the mechanisms through which democratic countries affect the 
environment. 
Finally, by comparing countries with different income levels, it is possible to learn 
the differences between democratic and autocratic governments in countries with different 
income groups. Although most studies include variables that are related to GDP per capita, 
the papers do not usually consider countries with different income levels separately. Assume 
again the case of the hypothetical researcher. As the results with openness of executive 
recruitment in upper middle-income countries, and executive constraints in low-income 
countries show, more significant relationships are expected if we consider countries with 
different income groups. Therefore, by including countries with different income levels, we 
may better understand the sources of potential heterogeneity in the relationships between 
democratic governments and environmental quality. 
 For future research, more environmental outcomes should be included. Although 
finding more environmental outcomes may be challenging, having more environmental 
outcomes especially those that are in the interests of the public may produce more meaningful 
results. Research based on this wider range of environmental outcomes will help understand 
the relationships between democratic countries and the environment. Many people may 
incorrectly estimate the importance of democratic governments on environmental quality if 
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only a few environmental outcomes are implemented. According to my analyses, as opposed 
to local environmental quality, democracy in low- and high-income countries improves global 
environmental outcomes. 
Since different components of democracy provide useful information, research 
assessing democratic countries should consider implementing these components. As opposed 
to competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, and 
competitiveness of political participation, executive constraints in low- and high-income 
countries improve global environmental outcomes. Since executive constraints provide more 
consistent and significant results, future research may focus on the reasons why executive 
constraints affect the environment, while the other components do not.  
Finally, as opposed to the results without countries with different income levels, the 
results with countries with different income groups suggest that democratic governments 
sometimes influence (usually positively) environmental quality. Therefore, research assessing 
democratic countries and the environment should consider estimating separate effects for 
countries with different income levels. According to my analyses, democracy in low- and 
high-income countries provides more significant results than that from middle-income 
countries.  
Furthermore, it would be beneficial to consider countries with different geographical 
regions. This approach would help policy makers and researchers learn about an effect of 
democratic governments on environmental quality in specific regions.
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Figure 1. Environmental outcomes across countries. 
 
Figure 2. Environmental outcomes over time. 
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Table 1. The three mechanisms and the four corresponding hypotheses. 
 
Mechanism 2. 
Democratic governments are less 
likely to effectively enact policies 
than autocratic governments. 
Mechanism 1. 
Democratic governments aim to 
satisfy the majority while 
autocratic governments aim to 
satisfy the elites, and these 
populations may have different 
preferences. 
Mechanism 3. 
Democratic governments are 
more likely to participate in 
global environmental treaties than 
autocratic governments. 
Hypothesis 1a: 
More democratic governments 
improve environmental outcomes 
directly affecting local health, 
while have no effect on or worsen 
environmental quality indirectly 
affecting local health. 
Hypothesis 1b:  
Democratic governments lead to 
better environmental quality in 
high-income countries, while lead 
to lower environmental quality in 
low-income countries. 
Hypothesis 2:  
Greater executive constraints lead 
to worse environmental quality. 
More democratic countries, 
measured as other component 
variables (e.g., competitiveness of 
political recruitment), have no 
effect on environmental quality. 
Hypothesis 3:  
Democratic governments lead to 
better global environmental 
quality, while have no effect on 
local environmental quality. 
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Table 2. Bottom twelve countries for each variable 
Ra
nk 
(lo
we
st 
to 
hig
hes
t) 
CO2 
emissions 
(kt)i 
Terrestrial protected 
areas (% of total land 
area)i 
Improved water sources 
(% of population with 
access)i 
Revised 
combined 
Polity scorei 
Institutional
ized 
autocracyi 
Institutionali
zed 
democracyi 
Competitiveness of 
executive 
recruitmenti 
Openness of 
executive 
recruitmenti 
Executive 
constraint
si 
Competitiveness of 
political 
participationi 
1 
Lesotho Djibouti Papua New Guinea Qatar 
Papua New 
Guinea 
Cuba Equatorial Guinea Congo 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Papua New Guinea 
2 Solomon 
Islands 
Solomon Islands Ethiopia Saudi Arabia Lebanon Uzbekistan Chad 
Central African 
Republic 
Qatar Bhutan 
3 Central 
African 
Republic 
Uruguay Madagascar Swaziland Slovenia Eritrea Sudan Gabon 
Uzbekista
n 
Nigeria 
4 Burundi Syria Mauritania Uzbekistan Canada Swaziland Cambodia Yemen Sudan Syria 
5 
Chad Lesotho Mozambique Oman Guyana Morocco Rwanda Uganda 
Swazilan
d 
Laos 
6 Cape 
Verde 
Lebanon Niger Bahrain Chile Congo Yemen Rwanda Cuba Qatar 
7 Guinea-
Bissau 
Yemen Guinea-Bissau Syria El Salvador Qatar Burkina Faso Sudan Congo Cuba 
8 
Gambia Mauritania 
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Romania 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Uganda Burkina Faso Bahrain 
United Arab 
Emirates 
9 Bhutan El Salvador Chad Laos Estonia Saudi Arabia Gabon Cambodia Gabon China 
10 
Djibouti Fiji Mali Kuwait 
Luxembour
g 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Central African 
Republic 
Chad Yemen Saudi Arabia 
11 
Mali Tunisia Equatorial Guinea China Hungary Kuwait Congo 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Equatoria
l Guinea 
Uzbekistan 
12 Eritrea Morocco Swaziland Cuba Argentina Sudan Guinea Guinea Chad Kyrgyz Republic 
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Table 3. Top twelve countries for each variable 
Ra
nk 
(lo
we
st 
to 
hig
hes
t) 
CO2 
emission
s (kt)i 
Terrestrial protected 
areas (% of total land 
area)i 
Improved water sources 
(% of population with 
access)i 
Revised 
combined 
Polity scorei 
Institutionali
zed 
autocracyi 
Institutionali
zed 
democracyi 
Competitiveness of 
executive 
recruitmenti 
Openness of 
executive 
recruitmenti 
Executive 
constraint
si 
Competitiveness of 
political 
participationi 
134 South 
Africa 
United Kingdom United Kingdom Japan Laos Uruguay Uruguay Azerbaijan India Netherlands 
135 Italy New Zealand Israel Cyprus China Slovenia Argentina Laos Belgium United States 
136 South 
Korea 
Tanzania Norway Sweden Cuba Austria 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Cyprus Lesotho United Kingdom 
137 Saudi 
Arabia 
Bhutan Finland Denmark Kuwait 
United 
Kingdom 
Bulgaria Belgium Australia Spain 
138 Canada Guatemala Germany Italy Syria Switzerland Panama Costa Rica Uruguay Japan 
139 United 
Kingdo
m 
Botswana Italy New Zealand 
United Arab 
Emirates 
New 
Zealand 
Belgium China Denmark Switzerland 
140 German
y 
Saudi Arabia Japan Ireland Bahrain Portugal India Malawi Paraguay Slovenia 
141 
India Trinidad and Tobago Spain Switzerland Oman 
United 
States 
El Salvador Finland 
Czech 
Republic 
Hungary 
142 
Japan Nicaragua Netherlands 
United 
Kingdom 
Uzbekistan Germany Israel Angola Norway France 
143 Russia Zambia New Zealand Netherlands Swaziland Japan Nicaragua Bolivia Mauritius Canada 
144 
China Germany Australia Finland 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Italy Slovenia Eritrea 
United 
States 
Austria 
145 United 
States 
Venezuela Denmark Hungary Qatar Mauritius Colombia Mexico 
Switzerla
nd 
Finland 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of response, key explanatory, and control variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Time periods 1992-2010 1992 2000 2010 
Response variables     
CO2 emissions (kt)i,t 167,662 123,605 129,280 237,416 
 (612,992) (345,681) (249,455) (956,188) 
Terrestrial protected areas (% of total land 
areai,t 
11.93 11.49 12.49 16.43 
 (9.322) (9.456) (9.063) (10.87) 
Improved water sources (% of population 
with access)i,t 
83.81 79.96 82.75 87.35 
 (18.10) (19.94) (20.15) (15.65) 
Key explanatory variables     
Revised combined Polity scorei,t-1 3.820 2.975 3.761 4.748 
 (6.522) (7.227) (6.681) (5.940) 
Institutionalized autocracyi,t-1 1.854 2.364 1.924 1.427 
 (2.790) (3.211) (2.884) (2.499) 
Institutionalized democracyi,t-1 5.687 5.455 5.667 6.182 
 (3.968) (4.247) (4.066) (3.732) 
Competitiveness of executive recruitmenti,t-1 2.096 2.078 2.076 2.200 
 (1.071) (1.073) (1.100) (1.056) 
Openness of executive recruitmenti,t-1 3.428 3.481 3.348 3.473 
 (1.309) (1.242) (1.353) (1.290) 
Executive constraintsi,t-1 5.003 4.831 5 5.273 
 (2.038) (2.273) (2) (1.891) 
Competitiveness of political participationi,t-1 3.490 3.312 3.576 3.627 
 (1.321) (1.507) (1.266) (1.291) 
Control variables     
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$)i,t-1 9,847 8,799 9,824 11,417 
 (14,636) (12,198) (13,698) (15,806) 
Total Populationi,t-1 3.968×e7 4.858×e7 3.795×e7 5.159×e7 
 (1.330×e8) (1.647×e8) (1.287×e8) (1.736×e8) 
Urban population (% of total)i,t-1 55.08 51.93 56.33 57.29 
 (22.51) (24.41) (22.46) (23.06) 
Land area (sq. km)i,t-1 808,583 896,555 807,116 824,667 
 (1.963×e6) (1.897×e6) (1.767×e6) (1.837×e6) 
Trade (% of GDP)i,t-1 79.61 66.96 76.43 82.79 
 (41.17) (43.66) (31.58) (34.90) 
Primary education enrollment ratei,t-1 0.362 0.354 0.358 0.378 
 (0.0892) (0.0891) (0.0892) (0.0803) 
Number of observations 1899 79 67 111 
Number of countries 145 79 67 111 
Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
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Table 5. Correlations among response variables. 
 (1) (2) 
Response variables CO2 emissions 
(kt)i,t 
Terrestrial protected areas (% of 
total land area)i,t 
Time periods 1992-2010 
Terrestrial protected areas (% of 
total land area)i,t 
0.0412*  
Improved water sources (% of 
population with access)i,t 
0.148*** 0.0472** 
Number of observations 1899 1899 
Number of countries  145 145 
Notes: ***, **, * is calculated based on t-statistics and denotes 10%, 5%, 1% significance level, 
respectively. 
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Table 6. Correlations among key explanatory variables and control variables. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Variables Revised 
combined 
Polity 
scorei,t-1 
Institutionalized 
autocracyi,t-1 
Institutionalized 
democracyi,t-1 
Competitiveness of 
executive 
recruitmenti,t-1 
Openness of 
executive 
recruitmenti,t-1 
Executive 
constraintsi,t-1 
Competitiveness of 
political 
participationi,t-1 
GDP per 
capita 
(constant 
2005 US$)i,t-
1 
Total 
Populationi,t-
1 
Urban 
population 
(% of 
total)i,t-1 
Land area 
(sq. km)i,t-1 
Trade (% 
of GDP)i,t-1 
Time periods 1992-2010 
Institutionalized 
autocracyi,t-1 
-0.953***            
Institutionalized 
democracyi,t-1 
0.977*** -0.865***           
Competitiveness of 
executive 
recruitmenti,t-1 
0.880*** -0.758*** 0.917***          
Openness of 
executive 
recruitmenti,t-1 
0.515*** -0.419*** 0.553*** 0.741***         
Executive 
constraintsi,t-1 
0.956*** -0.867*** 0.965*** 0.878*** 0.561***        
Competitiveness of 
political 
participationi,t-1 
0.856*** -0.771*** 0.868*** 0.711*** 0.409*** 0.797***       
GDP per capita 
(constant 2005 
US$)i,t-1 
0.386*** -0.234*** 0.471*** 0.391*** 0.170*** 0.426*** 0.475***      
Total Populationi,t-
1 
-0.00607 0.0170 0.00197 0.0313 0.0751*** 0.0307 -0.0554** -0.0341     
Urban population 
(% of total)i,t-1 
0.344*** -0.206*** 0.423*** 0.418*** 0.259*** 0.395*** 0.384*** 0.602*** -0.0868***    
Land area (sq. 
km)i,t-1 
0.0347 -0.0374 0.0307 0.0379 0.0691*** 0.0180 0.0475* 0.0533** 0.439*** 0.113***   
Trade (% of 
GDP)i,t-1 
0.0164 0.0182 0.0399 0.0702*** 0.0634*** 0.0416* 0.00331 0.130*** -0.234*** 0.108*** -0.263***  
Primary education 
enrollment ratei,t-1 
0.218*** -0.171*** 0.235*** 0.196*** 0.0932*** 0.235*** 0.205*** 0.195*** 0.0155 0.192*** 0.00544 0.0645*** 
Number of 
observations  
1899 1899 1899 1899 1899 1899 1899 1899 1899 1899 1899 1899 
Number of 
countries 
145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 
Notes: ***, **, * is calculated based on t-statistics and denotes 10%, 5%, 1% significance level, respectively. 
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Table 7. Fixed effects (FE) estimation of environmental quality on the three composite indicators (revised combined Polity score, institutionalized autocracy, and institutionalized democracy) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Response variables CO2 emissions (kt)i,t Terrestrial protected areas (% of total land area)i,t Improved water sources (% of population with access)i,t 
Time periods 1992-2010 1992-2010 1992-2010 
Revised combined Polity scorei,t-1 -3,318   -0.00646   0.0448   
 (2,771)   (0.0343)   (0.0678)   
Institutionalized autocracyi,t-1  6,638   0.105*   -0.0860  
  (5,651)   (0.0535)   (0.160)  
Institutionalized democracyi,t-1   -5,074   0.0595   0.0713 
   (4,339)   (0.0690)   (0.104) 
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$)i,t-1 32.29* 32.12* 32.64* -9.93e-07 -1.72e-05 8.25e-06 -0.000991*** -0.000989*** -0.000995*** 
 (17.64) (17.56) (17.79) (0.000173) (0.000173) (0.000174) (0.000229) (0.000227) (0.000230) 
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$)i,t-1
2 -0.000396 -0.000394 -0.000399 1.26e-09 1.37e-09 1.22e-09 4.62e-09** 4.60e-09** 4.66e-09** 
 (0.000240) (0.000240) (0.000242) (2.18e-09) (2.16e-09) (2.18e-09) (2.08e-09) (2.07e-09) (2.09e-09) 
Total Populationi,t-1 0.00960* 0.00959* 0.00960* -6.03e-09 -5.73e-09 -6.47e-09 3.43e-08*** 3.44e-08*** 3.43e-08*** 
 (0.00518) (0.00517) (0.00517) (9.64e-09) (9.85e-09) (9.51e-09) (1.15e-08) (1.14e-08) (1.15e-08) 
Urban population (% of total)i,t-1 13,223 13,321 13,150 -0.0466 -0.0452 -0.0456 0.107 0.106 0.108 
 (8,856) (8,878) (8,846) (0.0522) (0.0526) (0.0520) (0.139) (0.139) (0.140) 
Land area (sq. km)i,t-1 -7.836 -7.844 -7.838 3.40e-05 3.44e-05 3.35e-05 -3.92e-06 -3.80e-06 -3.90e-06 
 (6.169) (6.175) (6.176) (3.31e-05) (3.26e-05) (3.36e-05) (1.23e-05) (1.22e-05) (1.23e-05) 
Trade (% of GDP)i,t-1 198.9 200.8 192.9 0.00739 0.00769 0.00720 -0.000180 -0.000194 -0.000107 
 (200.4) (203.2) (197.0) (0.00493) (0.00489) (0.00494) (0.00921) (0.00916) (0.00925) 
Primary education enrollment ratei,t-1 -68,674 -64,222 -76,114 -2.490 -2.181 -2.637 19.72*** 19.68*** 19.82*** 
 (97,580) (99,086) (96,317) (2.688) (2.664) (2.674) (5.317) (5.281) (5.344) 
Number of observations 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 
R2 0.504 0.504 0.503 0.302 0.304 0.303 0.604 0.604 0.604 
Number of countries 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Coefficients on year variables and constants are not reported to save spaces. The Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 10%, 5%, 1% significance level, 
respectively.
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Table 8. Fixed effects (FE) estimation of environmental quality on the four component variables (competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive 
recruitment, executive constraints, and competitiveness of political participation) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Response variables CO2 emissions (kt)i,t Terrestrial protected areas (% of total land 
area)i,t 
Improved water sources (% of population with 
access)i,t 
Time periods 1992-2010 1992-2010 1992-2010 
Competitiveness of executive 
recruitmenti,t-1 
-11,475    0.0115    0.289    
 (13,523)    (0.173)    (0.341)    
Openness of executive 
recruitmenti,t-1 
 -8,032    0.0309    0.142   
  (9,096)    (0.0871)    (0.247)   
Executive constraintsi,t-1   -9,316    0.0521    4.62e-05  
   (7,750)    (0.125)    (0.243)  
Competitiveness of political 
participationi,t-1 
   -8,000    0.276*    0.283 
    (9,189)    (0.161)    (0.340) 
Number of observations 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 
R2 0.503 0.503 0.504 0.503 0.302 0.302 0.302 0.304 0.604 0.604 0.603 0.604 
Number of countries 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Coefficients on control variables, year variables and constants are not reported to save spaces. Coefficients on control variables are very similar to the ones 
using the three composite indicators. The Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 10%, 5%, 1% significance level, respectively.
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Table 9. Marginal effects of environmental quality on interactions among the three composite indicators and countries with four different income levels (low-, lower middle-, upper middle-, and high-income) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Response variables CO2 emissions (kt)i,t Terrestrial protected areas (% of total land area)i,t Improved water sources (% of population with access)i,t 
Time periods 1992-2010 1992-2010 1992-2010 
Revised combined Polity scorei,t-1×Low- income country dummyi,t-1 -12,643*   0.0710   -0.150   
 (6,995)   (0.0974)   (0.103)   
Revised combined Polity scorei,t-1×Lower middle- income country dummyi,t-1 2,881   -0.0422   0.0790   
 (3,840)   (0.0295)   (0.0859)   
Revised combined Polity scorei,t-1×Upper middle- income country dummyi,t-1 -10,503   0.00982   0.00307   
 (6,538)   (0.0511)   (0.0775)   
Revised combined Polity scorei,t-1×High- income country dummyi,t-1 -9,762*   0.146**   -0.0423   
 (5,822)   (0.0711)   (0.0774)   
Institutionalized autocracyi,t-1×Low- income country dummyi,t-1  24,334   -0.0293   0.361  
  (16,523)   (0.231)   (0.262)  
Institutionalized autocracyi,t-1×Lower middle- income country dummyi,t-1  -6,637   0.154***   -0.171  
  (7,963)   (0.0529)   (0.188)  
Institutionalized autocracyi,t-1×Upper middle- income country dummyi,t-1  23,622   0.0630   0.0333  
  (14,551)   (0.0804)   (0.188)  
Institutionalized autocracyi,t-1×High- income country dummyi,t-1  21,385   -0.206   0.133  
  (13,276)   (0.148)   (0.209)  
Institutionalized democracyi,t-1×Low- income country dummyi,t-1   -19,793*   0.155   -0.221 
   (10,401)   (0.164)   (0.172) 
Institutionalized democracyi,t-1×Lower middle- income country dummyi,t-1   5,232   -0.0174   0.123 
   (6,745)   (0.0572)   (0.144) 
Institutionalized democracyi,t-1×Upper middle- income country dummyi,t-1   -14,515   0.0700   0.0299 
   (9,672)   (0.0975)   (0.116) 
Institutionalized democracyi,t-1×High- income country dummyi,t-1   -13,661*   0.296**   -0.0457 
   (8,250)   (0.121)   (0.122) 
Number of observations 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 
R2 0.504 0.504 0.503 0.302 0.304 0.303 0.604 0.604 0.604 
Number of countries 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Coefficients on control variables, year variables and constants are not reported to save spaces. The Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 10%, 5%, 1% significance level, 
respectively.
 
 57 
Table 10. Marginal effects of environmental quality on interactions among the four component variables and countries with four different income levels (low-, lower middle-, upper middle-, and high-income) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Response variables CO2 emissions (kt)i,t Terrestrial protected areas (% of total land area)i,t Improved water sources (% of population with access)i,t 
Time periods 1992-2010 1992-2010 1992-2010 
Competitiveness of executive recruitmenti,t-1×Low-income country dummyi,t-1 -62,939    -0.0759    0.659    
 (46,380)    (0.619)    (1.386)    
Competitiveness of executive recruitmenti,t-1×Lower middle- income country dummyi,t-1 6,909    -0.109    0.0416    
 (17,699)    (0.169)    (0.433)    
Competitiveness of executive recruitmenti,t-1×Upper middle- income country dummyi,t-1 -40,192    0.0272    0.545    
 (29,324)    (0.276)    (0.351)    
Competitiveness of executive recruitmenti,t-1×High- income country dummyi,t-1 -40,581    0.722    0.338    
 (28,771)    (0.450)    (0.652)    
Openness of executive recruitmenti,t-1×Low- income country dummyi,t-1  -30,947*    0.401    -0.175   
  (18,209)    (0.442)    (0.614)   
Openness of executive recruitmenti,t-1×Lower middle- income country dummyi,t-1  -12,871    0.0467    -0.0603   
  (11,684)    (0.116)    (0.288)   
Openness of executive recruitmenti,t-1×Upper middle- income country dummyi,t-1  -623.6    -0.130    0.398**   
  (4,890)    (0.154)    (0.166)   
Openness of executive recruitmenti,t-1×High- income country dummyi,t-1  -1,226    0.286    0.691   
  (5,325)    (0.210)    (0.606)   
Executive constraintsi,t-1×Low- income country dummyi,t-1   -32,145**    0.426    -0.872***  
   (15,404)    (0.268)    (0.320)  
Executive constraintsi,t-1×Lower middle- income country dummyi,t-1   2,548    -0.0908    0.153  
   (10,492)    (0.0989)    (0.305)  
Executive constraintsi,t-1×Upper middle- income country dummyi,t-1   -20,410    0.110    -0.118  
   (13,600)    (0.182)    (0.278)  
Executive constraintsi,t-1×High- income country dummyi,t-1   -21,577*    0.571**    -0.349  
   (12,654)    (0.228)    (0.273)  
Competitiveness of political participationi,t-1×Low- income country dummyi,t-1    -20,605    -0.142    -0.241 
    (18,684)    (0.453)    (0.360) 
Competitiveness of political participationi,t-1×Lower middle- income country dummyi,t-1    14,885    0.215    0.531 
    (14,632)    (0.143)    (0.408) 
Competitiveness of political participationi,t-1×Upper middle- income country dummyi,t-1    -36,187    0.294    -0.00333 
    (30,845)    (0.244)    (0.448) 
Competitiveness of political participationi,t-1×High- income country dummyi,t-1    -26,428    0.701**    0.115 
    (20,529)    (0.316)    (0.351) 
Number of observations 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 1,899 
R2 0.503 0.503 0.504 0.503 0.302 0.302 0.302 0.304 0.604 0.604 0.603 0.604 
Number of countries 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 145 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Coefficients on control variables, year variables and constants are not reported to save spaces. The Huber-White robust standard errors are in parentheses. ***, **, * denotes 10%, 5%, 1% significance level, respectively. 
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